{% comment %} The polled half of a thread: pause banner, compliance notice, message history. EVERY string below arrived from a stranger (SECURITY-BASELINE §2) — message text, captions, card titles, button labels, attachment URLs. Three rules hold here and they are checked by apps/inbox/tests/test_hostile_content.py: * Nothing is marked safe. Default autoescaping is the whole defence for text. * No URL reaches an href or a src unless apps/inbox/rendering.py already put it in an Image/Link/Card, which it only does after apps.common.validators.is_renderable_url said http(s). A rejected one is already a Tombstone by the time it gets here, so there is no {% if %} in this file deciding it — the decision is made in Python, once. A Media part is the exception that proves it: its URL was *reversed* by rendering.py rather than received from anyone, and running a stranger-string check over one of our own routes would be theatre. * `rel="noopener noreferrer"` and `target="_blank"` on every outbound link: the destination is chosen by the same stranger. An but never an